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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of M&As on acquiring company market or systematic risk 
using a global sample of 34,221 completed deals that occurred between 1977 and 2012, 
covering 163 countries and 85 industries. The empirical analysis takes into account factors 
related to the method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirers’ bidding 
experience. For the overall sample, the results indicate that acquirers’ market risk (and hence 
their cost of capital) tends to increase post-merger. However, further analysis reveals that 
increased acquirers’ risk occurs only in cases where their ex-ante market risk is relatively low 
in relation to the risk of the market. We also show that cash payment deals for publicly listed 
targets contribute to reducing acquirers’ risk while diversification, whether global or across 
industry, has no significant impact. On the other hand, for serial acquirers, the risk increases 
significantly with further M&As.  
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1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) play an important role in the corporate world by facilitating 
the reallocation of the merged companies’ assets for potential synergy gains, so that markets 
can appropriately reward their shareholders and reassess their risk.  
While there is a large literature investigating shareholder wealth effects (or abnormal returns) 
of merger announcements, relatively few studies have examined their impact on acquirers’ 
market or systematic risk. Although a firm’s total risk is composed of both systematic risk and 
unsystematic risk, the literature examines mainly systematic risk using the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), since it is assumed that unsystematic risk is diminished with a well-diversified 
portfolio. Thus, according to CAPM theory, a firm’s risk-return trade-off can be influenced via 
diversification achieved through M&As.  Most of the studies have focussed on investigating 
acquirers’ risk associated with geographical or industry level diversification. By contrast, 
studies on shareholder wealth effects of M&As have accounted for the relevance of other deal 
characteristics such as the method of payment, target status or acquirers experience, but there 
is little or no such prior evidence on acquirers’ systematic risk. This study aims to fill the gap 
by providing evidence relating to the impact of diversification as well as of the other deal 
characteristics on the systematic risk of the acquirer.  
A major contribution of the study is the utilisation of a worldwide sample of 34,221 completed 
deals covering 163 countries and 85 sub-industries over the period 1977-2012. While our 
unique dataset covers merger transactions across both financial and non-financial sectors, it 
facilitates investigation of several hypotheses to provide evidence for both developed and 
developing regions of the world. Extant research on M&As has generally utilised small or 
medium sized samples and mainly for developed countries1. This paper aims to establish 
evidence at broader cross-country level with particular focus on four main deal characteristics: 
the method of payment (cash versus stock), status of target (listed or unlisted), deal type (focus 
versus diversification), and acquirers’ prior experience, while controlling for other relevant 
                                                          
1 A majority of studies have used small samples, typically less than 1000 deals. For example, Raj and Uddin 
(2013) used a sample of 340 deals, Casu et al. (2015) used 272 international deals, and Amihud et al. (2012) used 
214 deals. Studies involving relatively large samples include Ahern (2007) with 12,942 deals, and Moeller et al. 
(2005) with 12,023 deals. In the middle of the spectrum, Focarelli et al. (2008) used 1,400 deals; Jaffe et al. (2015) 
used deals involving 835 subsidiaries and 2,571 public targets. 
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firm and country level characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, except for diversification, 
the literature has not examined the impact of such deal characteristics on acquirers’ risk. 
The main purpose of our investigation is to examine whether acquirers’ market/systematic risk 
changes significantly with M&As and how this is influenced by the aforementioned deal 
characteristics. In order to accomplish this, the statistical significance of the change in risk 
(before and after merger announcement) is tested using univariate analysis for the overall 
sample as well as for various categories of deals. The analysis is then extended to multivariate 
level using risk regressions to assess the impact on the change in systematic risk by 
incorporating acquirers’ pre-merger (ex-ante) risk and various deal, firm and country level 
characteristics. This enables formal testing of our hypotheses relating to how acquirers’ risk is 
influenced by the payment mode, target status, diversification and acquirers’ experience. 
Although the results initially suggest that acquirers’ risk (and hence their cost of capital) tends 
to increase post-merger, we find that the increased risk arises only in cases where the acquirers’ 
pre-merger risk is relatively low in relation to the risk of the market, not otherwise.  Further 
analysis reveals that cash payment deals incur lower risk for acquirers while stock payments 
deals generally increase their risk. On the other hand, diversification, whether cross-border or 
cross-industry, does not significantly affect acquirers’ risk. Finally, consistent with the hubris 
motive, our findings reveal that, for serial acquirers, the risk increases significantly with further 
M&As. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant evidence on 
acquirers’ risk from M&As. Section 3 discusses the relevant hypotheses while section 4 
presents the methodology and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes.  
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2. Related Literature 
Focussing on systematic/market risk, portfolio theory suggests that this element of total risk 
cannot be reduced by creating a portfolio of diversified stocks that are uncorrelated2. Therefore, 
the main issue is whether M&As affect acquirers’ systematic risk, as reflected in the cost of 
capital (beta) or the value of the firm.  
The empirical evidence is generally mixed. While some studies reveal that M&As reduce 
acquirers’ risk, others report evidence of either increased risk or no significant (or mixed) 
impact. Table 1 summarises the evidence of previous studies assessing different measures of 
portfolio risk, which include total and systematic risk, where total risk (measured by the 
variance of the acquirer’s returns) is the sum of both systematic and unsystematic (or 
idiosyncratic) risk. Earlier studies focussed on industrial sectors, while more recent studies 
have concentrated on financial sectors, investigating the impact of focussed versus diversified 
M&As. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The earliest study by Lev and Mandelker (1972) argues that unless the returns to both parties 
involved in the merger are perfectly correlated, the variances of the combined firms’ returns 
will be less than the weighted average of the variances of the individual firms’ returns (based 
on the diversification principle of portfolio theory). However, they find no significant impact 
on systematic risk. Joehnk and Nielsen (1974) indicate that systematic risk tends to be 
responsive, in varying degrees, to major conglomerate mergers with betas changing in 
accordance with confined pre-merger values. Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987) show that while all 
mergers increase unsystematic risk, related mergers are associated with a significant decline in 
systematic and total risk.  
Among later studies for industrial sectors, Chatterjee et al. (1992) indicate that mergers of non-
competing products sharing core technologies are capable of reducing systematic risk due to 
different pre-merger risk characteristics depicted by related and unrelated bidders. Sharma and 
                                                          
2 The empirical studies reviewed in this section investigate the impact of M&As on systematic risk, although in 
the aftermath of the recent global financial crises some recent studies have examined the effect of M&As on 
systemic risk pertaining to the stability of the financial (or banking) system. Given the composition of our global 
sample of M&A deals, which covers predominantly industrial categories, the analysis of systemic risk is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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Thistle (1996) propose increased market power as a possible source of reduction in systematic 
risk although their empirical findings reveal an insignificant effect of this attribute. Rahim and 
Ananaba (2000) show that the total risk of merged entities increased in both conglomerate and 
non-conglomerate mergers, while post-merger betas also increased significantly in both cases 
but less so for conglomerate mergers. Dube and Glascock (2006) analyse risk (and return) 
characteristics of M&As financed via different payment modes, and find that cash payment 
transactions significantly increase post-merger risk. Mei and Sun (2008) and Evripidou (2012) 
reveal that horizontal mergers reduced acquirers’ systematic risk and generated synergy gains 
from increased cost/scale efficiencies.  
Subsequent research has also examined the risk implications of M&As in the financial sectors. 
Allen and Jagtiani (2000) find that while total risk is reduced through diversification of banks 
into insurance sectors, non-bank activities tended to increase acquiring banks’ systematic risk, 
leading them to conclude that such diversification benefits are not large enough to justify the 
increase in bankers’ remit to operate in the insurance underwriting business and other non-bank 
securities. Amihud et al. (2002) find an insignificant impact on the total and systematic risk of 
acquiring banks. As a result, they emphasise that regulators need not be concerned with the 
risk implications of cross-border mergers. Similarly, Mishra et al. (2005) find an insignificant 
impact of non-conglomerate (bank with bank) U.S. mergers on the systematic risk of acquiring 
banks, while such mergers reduced their unsystematic risk (and hence total risk). On the other 
hand, Bozos et al. (2013) reveal that large bank mergers not only increase acquirers’ systematic 
risk, but there is a tendency for the beta to rise immediately following deal announcements and 
remain relatively high for up to two years afterwards. Focarelli et al. (2008) find that acquirers’ 
systematic risk increase overall after merger announcement, though risk is decreased in the 
case of cross-border bank acquirers that had high per-merger beta. Chen et al. (2011) find that 
systematic risk decreases after mergers between banks and insurance companies while total 
risk remained unchanged. Casu et al. (2015) find that mergers between banks and securities 
firms yield increases in total risk through higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic risks.  
Overall, the empirical evidence is inconclusive and, therefore, it is difficult to draw any clear 
conclusions about the implications of M&As on acquirers’ risk. This may be because the 
evidence is generally industry-specific and relates mainly to diversification issues, ignoring the 
influence of other deal characteristics, such as payment method, target status and acquirers 
experience.  Therefore, we exploit the diverse nature of our worldwide sample to provide robust 
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evidence examining not only the impact of diversification but also of these other associated 
deal characteristics. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
While our main investigation focusses on whether that there is any significant difference in 
acquirers’ systematic risk from M&A announcements, as mentioned above we seek also to 
determine the impact on acquirers’ risk of specific deal characteristics relating to merger type 
(focus/diversification), payment method, target status and acquirers’ bidding experience.  
With regard to the method of payment, Fuller et al. (2002) among others have proposed that 
stock is a less preferable payment mechanism than cash, owing to information asymmetry 
associated with bidder and target valuations as well as the uncertainty about the expected 
synergy.  Since each party in the transaction is in a better position to judge whether their own 
stocks are overvalued or undervalued, from the perspective of the bidder the stock payment 
mechanism accounts for the valuation uncertainty. This implication follows from the 
overvaluation hypothesis, originally developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), which suggests 
that if the bidder offers stock the market perceives that its stock is overvalued, hence there 
would be a negative response to its stock price upon announcement. However, from the 
perspective of the target firm, since it is difficult to gauge the valuation of the bidder’s stocks 
it would generally prefer cash payments.  Correspondingly, if the bidder offers cash instead of 
stock, it conveys a stronger signal to the market about its valuation and expected synergy, 
which therefore yields a positive response from the market upon announcement. The foregoing 
analysis suggests that stock payments will typically yield negative abnormal returns while cash 
payments generate positive returns for bidder shareholders. Correspondingly, it can be inferred 
from the risk-return trade-off theory that cash payment deals will imply lower systematic risk 
for acquirers post-merger while stock payment deals will lead to higher risk.  Therefore, our 
first hypothesis can be stated as:  
H1: Cash method of payment is associated with systematic risk decrease while stock method 
of payment is associated with systematic risk increase for acquirers post-merger.  
It should be noted that the overvaluation hypothesis is associated with targets being public (or 
listed).  It does not necessary hold in cases of stock payment offers for non-public (unlisted) 
targets, where positive bidder returns have been observed in empirical studies by Fuller et al. 
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(2002), Moeller et al. (2004), and Jaffe et al. (2015). Their evidence shows that mergers with 
private or subsidiary targets should be treated differently from those with public targets, due to 
the differences in the information asymmetry associated with public versus private targets. 
Listed firms are exposed to the scrutiny of the stock market, as they are subject to regulations 
regarding transparency and the issuance of certain types of information, which implies less 
uncertainty regarding their value (Feito-Ruiz and Requejo, 2014). Private firms, by contrast, 
have more control over the kind of information they disclose to markets (Reuer and Ragozzino, 
2008). The comparative lack of information about private targets increase the risk of 
inaccurately valuing the target’s assets and so the acquiring company may be able to obtain 
shareholder gains by forcing a private target to accept a substantial discount in the purchase 
price (Makadok and Barney, 2001). The information asymmetry translates to a lack of effective 
competition among acquirers of such targets. Added to this argument is the claim that unlisted 
targets are typically less liquid than listed targets, which heightens the negotiating power of 
potential acquirers in seeking lower payment for the former, thus creating positive abnormal 
returns for acquirers (Capron and Shen, 2007). These considerations suggest that acquisitions 
of unlisted targets will yield positive abnormal returns while those of public targets will 
generate negative abnormal returns for the bidding firms. Correspondingly, merger deals with 
private targets will imply higher market risk for acquirers than deals with public targets.  Our 
second hypothesis can be simply stated as: 
H2: Public status of the target is associated with systematic risk decrease of acquirers post-
merger 
On the question of focussed versus diversified M&As, the risk implications may be dependent 
upon motives which are typically economic, finance or strategy based. In cross-border mergers, 
besides growth there may be other opportunities to exploit, such as imperfections in capital 
markets and differences in taxation (Weston et al. 2001), capturing rents resulting from market 
inefficiencies (Servaes and Zenner, 1994), or synergies based on different knowledge and skills 
which gets diffused through such mergers. In cases of inter-industry mergers, the market power 
theory suggests that the merged entity is able to influence the market price and hence beat the 
rivals (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). Thus, bidder abnormal returns are likely to be 
significantly higher in diversified M&A announcements than in focused ones.  
Correspondingly, diversification may reduce acquirers’ systematic risk. However, diversified 
deals may also be riskier due to greater information asymmetry, uncertainty, potential costs of 
8 
 
monitoring and market-specific factors associated with expansion into different markets 
(Berger et al. 2017). These considerations suggest that diversification has no clear and 
unambiguous impact on acquirers’ risk.  This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: Diversification has no significant impact on acquirers’ systematic risk post-merger.  
 With regard to acquirers’ bidding experience, the conventional view is that such experience 
aids acquirers insofar as they are able to learn from the past, which therefore helps them to be 
successful in subsequent attempts. Serial acquirers, who tend to have the experience and skills 
necessary to achieve success in merger deals, are recognised as being more likely to achieve 
positive outcomes in this regard where benefits may also be associated with the size and 
prestige of the target company (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). Nevertheless, the hubris or 
over-optimism motives of mergers, which stands in contrast to the rational, synergy-based 
theories, suggest that with increased experience, acquirers tend to destroy rather than improve 
shareholder value (Roll, 1986). Consequently, repeat acquirers with previous experience are 
likely to incur higher risk than single acquirers, which leads to the postulation of our fourth 
hypothesis:  
H4: Systematic risk of serial acquirers increases with subsequent mergers. 
4. Methodology and Data  
In order to test the above hypotheses, we follow the approach of previous studies by comparing 
the acquirers’ systematic risk for approximately one year before and one year after merger 
announcement (Amihud et al. 2002, Focarelli et al. 2008). A two-step approach is adopted. In 
the first step, an estimate of the acquirer’s market risk is obtained using the CAPM model. The 
use of CAPM is necessary in order to obtain an estimate of the change in the acquirer’s market 
risk (∆ Beta), which reflects its systematic volatility, brought about by the deal announcement. 
The second step involves conducting univariate and multivariate analyses (risk regressions) on 
the change in the acquirer’s beta to formally test the above hypotheses relating to the impact 
of diversification, payment method, target status, and acquirers’ prior experience. 
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4.1. Estimating Beta 
Consider a standard CAPM model in the presence of a risk-free asset: 
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡  × (𝑅𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡     (1) 
Where Rijt is the return of the stock of firm i in country j at time t, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rmjt 
is the return of market m index in country j at time t, Betaijt is the measure of the firm’s market 
risk, and εijt is the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) shock.  
Defining σ2ijt and σ2mjt as the variances of Rijt and Rmjt, respectively, a measure of the firm’s 
total risk (volatility) is derived by taking the variance of equation (1): 
𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑡
2 = 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 𝜎𝑚𝑗𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝑒𝑗𝑡
2       (2) 
where: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑚 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑖,𝑚)
𝜎𝑚
2        (3) 
Thus, the firm’s total risk is the sum of its systematic volatility, Betaijt · σ2mjt, and idiosyncratic 
volatility, σ2ijt. It is well known from standard portfolio theory that idiosyncratic risk does not 
affect prices (e.g. Cochrane 2001). Therefore, to analyse the effect of a deal announcement on 
an acquirers’ systematic risk (or cost of capital), we concentrate on the component reflecting 
systematic volatility and neglect the idiosyncratic volatility.  
Using an event study approach, the change in acquirers’ systematic risk is determined by the 
difference in its average beta value before and after deal announcement (i.e. ∆Beta = Beta after 
deal - Beta before deal). The acquirer’s pre-merger (ex-ante) risk is calculated for the period –
260 to –20 trading days before announcement day, and its post-merger risk is calculated for the 
period +20 to +260 trading days after announcement day3. This measure of the acquirer’s 
change in beta as a result of the merger announcement represents an estimate of its systematic 
volatility brought about by the deal, and therefore affects its cost of capital (Focarelli et al. 
2008; Evripidou 2012).  
                                                          
3 In a year there are 260 trading days. The 40 days window around the event (-20, +20) is excluded from the 
calculation to avoid any distortion in the results caused by the announcement.  
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The daily market log-returns of all acquirers in the sample (based on their stock price) are 
calculated using the benchmark local price index (available in Datastream). An average beta 
value is then computed using the formulas (1)-(3) above separately for the event window before 
and after deal announcement, and the difference between the two corresponds to the change in 
the acquirer’s systematic risk. 
4.2. Risk Regressions  
We use cross-sectional risk regressions as part of multivariate analysis to analyse the effect of 
various deal characteristics on acquirers’ systematic risk, including the method of payment, 
target status, diversification and acquirer bidding experience. The process involves regressing 
the acquirers’ ∆Beta on these four explanatory variables as well as a host of control variables 
which include the initial level of beta, other firm and country level factors.  The regression 
model is postulated as follows: 
∆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝐵1𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑀𝐼𝑋𝑖 + 𝐵4𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑖 +  𝐵5𝐺𝐷𝑖 + 𝐵6𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝐵7𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝐵8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑉𝑇𝑖 +
𝐵9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝐵10𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖 + 𝐵12𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐽 + 𝐵13𝑀/𝐵𝑖 + 𝐵14𝐼𝑃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖    (4) 
Where ∆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 is the change in the acquirer’s market risk; CSHi, STCi and MIXi are dummy 
variables denoting Cash only, Stock only and Mixed (combined cash and stock) payment 
methods respectively (each taking value 1 if the acquirer paid using the stated method, 0 
otherwise);  PUBi represents targets which are publicly listed as opposed to unlisted (thus 
taking value 1 if target is listed, 0 otherwise). GD and ID are dummy variables representing 
geographic and industry diversification (taking value 1 for deals where the acquirer and target 
are located in different countries and industries, respectively, 0 otherwise); and EXPi represents 
acquirer prior experience determined by the cumulative number of previous takeovers by the 
same acquirer during the three-year or five-year period prior to announcement (hereafter 3-Y 
or 5-Y, respectively).  In the regressions, for brevity, we show the results for 3-Y only.   
 
The control variables included in the regressions to allow for both firm-level and country-
specific heterogeneity are: VTi which denotes the value of transaction (logarithm of deal value 
in US $mil, i.e. total value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses) 
to represent target size; GDPj which represents (logarithm of) GDP per capita of country j 
where the target is located; 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 which is the acquirer’s ‘beta before deal’; BSi which 
represents bidder’s size (the logarithm of market value of bidder in US $mil, calculated by 
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multiplying the total number of bidder shares times its stock price four weeks prior to the 
announcement date); LIQj which is the legal institutional quality indicator for target country j; 
M/Bi, the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio on announcement day; and IPj which denotes investor 
protection (taking value 1 if the target is located in a country that applies common law, 0 
otherwise).  
4.3. Data 
The M&A dataset includes all completed deals announced between 1977 and 20124. The 
criteria for inclusion in the sample are: First, the acquirers are publicly listed and the targets 
should be public, private or subsidiary firms, which allows the sample to be distinguished 
according to the target type5. Second, the sample covers deals with transaction values of at least 
$1 million6, as larger transactions have ‘unthinly’ traded stocks and a stronger effect on the 
share prices (Healy et al. 1992)7. Third, to avoid the confounding effects of multiple bids, we 
excluded deals with more than one bid made by a bidder over a window of 21 days. Fourth, for 
the same reason, we excluded M&A deals made by the same bidder within the previous 110 
days. Finally, we excluded deals where acquirers’ market value and share prices (and/or the 
local index prices) were not available in Datastream.   
Applying the above criteria led to a total sample of 34,221 completed deals covering 163 
countries and 85 industries over the period 1977-2012. Only completed deals were considered 
to avoid distortions caused by unsuccessful deals in the post-event period over which the 
change in beta is calculated8. The sample of deals distinguished according to year and acquirer-
target countries showed that USA had the largest number of M&A transactions both as 
acquiring and target country, followed by UK and Japan. 
                                                          
4 At the time of data collection, the status of many of the deals announced after 2012 was uncertain (incomplete) 
and so such deals could not be included, given that the analysis of acquirers’ risk requires not only certainty about 
completed deals but also daily share price data availability for at least one year before and one year after 
announcement date.  The information on deals and share price data are obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) M&A database and Datastream, respectively. 
5
The acquirer must have an interest of 50% or more in a target to represent M&A deal, thus raising its interest 
from below 50% to above 50% (including acquiring the remaining interest up to 100%).  
6 We follow Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004), among others, to employ a £1m USD deal value cut-off 
point as a means to avoid the results being affected by small deals, which amount to outliers. 
7 Firms whose stocks are thinly traded there can have high frequency of zeros which could result in non-normal 
distributions (Campbell and Wesley 1993). 
8 For example, we found 3,064 unsuccessful deals during the 364 days after announcement date, and therefore it 
is not appropriate to include such deals in the evaluation of acquirers’ market risk. 
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5. Empirical Results  
To analyse the impact of M&As on acquirers’ risk (cost of capital), we measure acquirers’ 
market risk (or beta) using the method outlined in section 4.1. The statistical significance of 
the change in beta (∆Beta) for the overall sample as well as for the relevant sub-categories of 
deals is first conducted using univariate analysis. This is followed by multivariate analyses 
(risk regressions) to test the hypotheses postulated in section 3, relating to the impact of the 
method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirers’ prior experience.  
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents the main results on acquirers’ beta statistics for the entire sample of 34,221 
completed deals as well as for the relevant sub-samples pertaining to the four categories 
(method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirers’ experience). Both parametric 
(independent samples t-test) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U test) tests are employed to 
test for mean differences in ∆Beta among the categories. For the sake of brevity, only the main 
results for the sub-samples are presented.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The results indicate that the acquirer’s market risk increases after deal announcement. For the 
overall sample, the average ‘Beta before deal’ is 0.730, and the average ‘Beta after deal’ is 
0.751. Thus, the increase in beta is 0.021 which is consistent with other empirical studies. For 
example, Amihud et al. (2002) and Focarelli et al. (2008) both report slight increases in average 
betas of 0.023. In the above results, ∆Beta is statistically significant, suggesting that acquirers’ 
systematic risk increases after M&As. Furthermore, the results confirm that acquirers’ risk 
increases irrespective of the nature of the deal, given that all categories of deals have a positive 
and statistically significant ∆Beta. However, the mean differences in ∆Beta within each 
category are not always statistically significant.  
An explanation for the increase in the acquirer’s post-merger risk is that its beta may be lower 
than the beta of the target. Hence, during the takeover process, there is likely to be an increase 
in the acquirer’s beta in light of the fact that the beta value of the combined entity will reflect 
the betas of both the acquirer and the target. This is the conventional argument drawn from a 
portfolio investment perspective, and the increase is more likely in the case of higher agency 
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costs (greater information asymmetry between targets and acquirers). Furthermore, there are 
specific market risks associated with M&As, particularly with cross-border or cross-industry 
expansion, which may offset any risk reduction associated with diversification. For instance, 
increased risk could be associated with higher potential costs in diversified deals if the target 
firm’s customer base is high. 
5.2 Controlling for Acquirers’ pre-merger risk  
The above analysis does not consider the impact of M&As on acquirers’ market risk while 
accounting for their pre-merger risk. Therefore, we examine whether the systematic risk 
demonstrated by acquiring company prior to a deal influence its risk post-merger. Our rationale 
for expecting different systematic risk effects for low and high market risk acquiring company 
is based on Furfine and Rosen (2011) who suggest that acquiring company use M&As as a tool 
to reach the target risk. Under this perspective, if we view the average systematic risk within 
the industry as a proxy for the systematic risk of the targets, we should observe that the riskiest 
acquiring company experiences a reduction in systematic risk, while the least risky one 
increases its post-merger risk towards the industry mean. Thus, we re-analyse the results by 
examining whether M&As reduce the market risk of acquirers with high ex-ante risk, and 
correspondingly increase the risk of acquirers with lower ex-ante risk (relative to the beta of 
the home market portfolio). Specifically, our analysis suggests that the main investigation 
relating to the overall impact of M&As can be broken down into the following propositions: 
(1) M&As increase acquirers’ market risk if their ex-ante market risk is lower than the risk of 
the market portfolio (i.e. beta before deal < 1); and (2) M&As decrease acquirers’ market risk 
if their ex-ante market risk is higher than the risk of the market portfolio (i.e. beta before deal 
> 1). 
The above propositions can be tested by splitting the overall sample of M&A deals into two 
groups according to whether acquirers’ ‘pre-beta’ values (i.e. beta before deal) are less than or 
greater than the beta of the market portfolio (equal to 1). Table 3 below presents the results for 
acquirers’ beta statistics for the two sub-samples, which comprises of 24,058 deals with 
acquirers’ pre-beta < 1 and 10,163 deals with pre-beta >1. The table also shows the statistics 
for the relevant sub-categories (as in Table 2), but in this case it is not necessary to test for 
mean differences. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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The results show that, in the overall sample, ∆Beta is positive (0.1243) for acquirers with pre-
beta <1 and negative (–0.2224) for acquirers with pre-beta >1. This result suggests that M&As 
increased systematic risk of acquirers with relatively low ex-ante market risk (in relation to the 
beta of the market portfolio) and reduced their risk in cases where their ex-ante market risk was 
high. These results are similar for all sub-categories of the sample, implying that the above 
finding holds irrespective of the nature of a deal.  
There may be several reasons why acquirers benefit from risk-reduction through M&As if their 
pre-merger risk is high compared to that of the home market index. Diversification and synergy 
motives are obvious examples of risk reduction where efficiency/synergy gains are possible. 
However, this logic does not explain the opposite effect, i.e. where acquirers with lower 
systematic risk have their risk increased after M&As. Investigation of other deal characteristics 
is therefore important in explaining the increase in acquirers’ risk post-merger.  In general, the 
findings indicate that low-risk acquirers tend to increase their systematic risk with M&As while 
high-risk acquirers reduce their systematic risk by doing so. 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis: Risk regressions  
For further investigation of factors affecting acquirers’ risk, including testing of hypotheses H1 
– H4, we conduct cross-sectional regressions with relevant conditioning variables, which 
include target status, method of payment, diversification, and acquirers’ prior bidding 
experience, alongside other control variables discussed above to account for firm and country 
level heterogeneity.  Additionally, in all regressions, we account for industry, country and year 
fixed effects, and the minimum set of control variables which include acquirers’ pre-beta (to 
control for their ex-ante risk), target size (proxied by deal value), bidder size (acquirers’ market 
capitalisation), and the GDP per capita of the target countries. Additionally, in some 
regressions, we include acquirers’ market-to-book ratio and control for investor protection 
(legal origin) and institutional quality in the target countries, noting that these added effects 
(which reduce the sample size) are intended mainly to assess the consistency of the results.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 presents the results of 11 models aiming to analyse the impact of the above M&A 
factors on acquirers’ risk. The estimation of models 1-6 uses a sample of 33,488 completed 
deals (reduced from 34,221) as we selectively add relevant explanatory variables relating to 
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method of payment, target status, diversification, and bidding experience. Models 7-9 include 
all additional control variables which further reduces the sample size, and Models 10-11 are 
estimated for deals involving only U.S. and non-U.S. acquirers, respectively. All regressions 
are statistically significant, as confirmed by the value of the F-statistic. The explanatory power 
for the values of R2 and adjusted R2, albeit low, is consistent with most prior empirical research 
using cross-sectional M&As data.  
The results relating to the method of payment (cash vs. stock) confirm a negative effect of cash 
payment deals and a positive effect of stock payment deals, both being statistically significant. 
In contrast, the impact of mixed-payment deals is not significant. Our results therefore support 
hypothesis H1, which suggests that cash-only payment deals lead to systematic risk decrease 
for acquirers while stock-only payment deals increase their risk; a finding which is generally 
consistent with the view that positive (negative) abnormal returns are typically observed for 
acquirers engaging in cash-only (stock-only) deals, as a result of the overvaluation hypothesis. 
With regard to acquiring a public target, the results also confirm a negative and statistically 
significant impact on acquirers’ risk across all models, which is consistent with the univariate 
results (Tables 2 and 3) in that deals with public targets incur lower risk for acquirers than deals 
with non-public (private or subsidiary) targets. This observation, which supports hypothesis 
H2 above, may be because of less information asymmetry associated with the acquisition of 
public (as opposed to non-public) targets. As this yields typically lower shareholder returns for 
the acquirers (due to the overvaluation hypothesis), their systematic risk is correspondingly 
reduced.   
Turning to the impact of diversification, the results reveal no statistically significant impact 
(models 5-11) except for the sample of U.S. acquirers (model 10), for whom cross-border deals 
appear to increase risk slightly. Overall, consistent with hypothesis H3, our results indicate that 
diversification has little or no impact on acquirers’ risk, a result which stands in contrast to 
standard portfolio theory which suggests that diversification may reduce risk. However, as 
explained earlier, there can be several other factors which may increase acquirers’ risk with 
international diversification, and so the association between diversification and risk could be 
ambiguous (as posited in H3). Even after controlling for other factors in the risk regressions, 
the results confirm no significant impact of diversification on acquirers’ risk. 
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With regard to acquirers’ bidding experience, the results suggest a robustly positive and 
statistically significant impact on acquirers’ risk. This finding is also in tandem with the 
univariate results in Tables 2-3, where acquirers’ risk is found to be higher for multiple bidders 
than for single bidders. These results are therefore consistent with hypothesis H4, which 
suggests that, for serial acquirers, systematic risk increases significantly with further M&A's.  
As for the control variables, the results confirm that acquirers’ pre-beta is negatively associated 
with their post-merger risk, consistent with the univariate analysis. Hackbarth and Morellec 
(2008) argue that a pre-merger run-down on the acquirer’s stock may occur if the acquirer’s 
core asset beta values are lower than the target’s core asset beta values, and the opposite may 
occur when bidder beta values are significantly larger than those of the target. Such a market 
response could therefore explain this negative effect of pre-beta on acquirers’ risk. The results 
also reveal a positive impact of transaction value and bidder size. These factors may reflect the 
firm’s leverage capacity, and therefore have a counterbalancing effect on risk (as opposed to 
pre-beta). Additionally, the results indicate a significant negative impact of target country GDP 
as expected. Since GDP represents a proxy for economic development, acquirers aiming for 
targets in bigger countries may benefit from geographical diversification, therefore implying a 
negative impact on their risk.  
5.4 Robustness  
As a robustness check, we report in Table 5 the regression results by splitting the global sample 
of deals into two groups according to whether acquirers’ ‘pre-beta’ values (i.e. beta before deal) 
are less than or greater than unity, as with the univariate analysis above. As in Table 3, this 
sample-split reveals a higher proportion of acquirers with pre-beta <1. In these set of results, 
the diversification dummies are omitted since their effects are insignificant. The main results 
hold, in particular the negative impact on risk of cash-only and public target deals, and the 
positive impact of deals involving stock-only payment, private targets, and serial acquirers. 
Additionally, acquirers’ pre-beta has a negative impact on risk in both samples, which is 
consistent with that found in the univariate results, confirming that acquirers’ ex-ante risk has 
a negative influence on the change in acquirers’ risk (∆Beta). The effect of acquirers’ size on 
risk is also consistently positive and significant throughout. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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6. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the impact of M&As on acquirers’ risk using evidence based on global 
sample of M&A deals. We contribute to the literature by presenting evidence pertaining to 
systematic risk, calculated using the capital asset pricing model. The change is acquirers’ risk 
post-merger is determined using an event study approach and then tested for mean differences 
across various sub-categories of deals, associated with target status, payment method, 
diversification and acquirers’ bidding experience. Cross-sectional regressions are then 
performed to investigate several hypotheses which we formulate in relation to the impact on 
these deal characteristics on acquirers’ risk. Our study makes a contribution by providing 
robust evidence on acquirers’ risk using a very large and diverse sample of M&A deals and 
investigating not only the impact of diversification but also of the other aforementioned 
characteristics which, to our best knowledge, have not been previously examined in the 
literature. 
The overall findings from univariate analysis indicate that, while acquirers’ systematic risk 
(and hence their cost of capital) tends to increase post-merger, this is so only in cases where 
their pre-merger risk is relatively low in relation to the risk of the market. Acquirers’ systematic 
risk decreases when their pre-merger risk is relatively high in relation to the risk of the market.  
An interpretation that follows from this analysis is that high risk acquirers (relative to the risk 
of acquiring peers in the home market) could benefit from risk reduction through M&As while 
low risk acquirers will correspondingly increase their risk. The results from cross-sectional 
regressions confirm this negative effect of acquirers’ pre-merger risk.  
Our results also indicate that diversification does not change acquirers’ risk in any significant 
way, whereas other factors (e.g. target status, payment method and acquirers experience) do. 
In particular, cash payment deals and acquisitions of public targets reduce acquirers’ risk, while 
stock-payment deals increase their risk. For serial acquirers, risk increases significantly with 
more acquisitions. 
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Table 1: Studies on M&As and Acquirers’ Risk 
Authors Period  Sector Geography Type of Deal 
Type of 
Risk* 
Results* 
Lev and 
Mandelker (1972) 
1952-1963 Diversified U.S. 69 deals, Diversified SR No effect 
Joehnk and 
Nielsen (1974) 
1962-1969 Diversified U.S. 
21 Conglomerate and 
23 Non-Conglomerate 
SR Increased SR 
Lubatkin and 
O’Neill (1987) 
1954-1973 Diversified U.S. 
297 Vertical, Related, 
and Unrelated Mergers 
TR, SR, 
USR 
Increase USR, 
reduce SR & TR 
Chatterjee et al. 
(1992) 
1962-1979 
Concentric, 
conglomerate 
mergers 
U.S. 120 Vertical Mergers SR Reduce SR 
Sharma and 
Thistle (1996) 
1981-1984 
Diversified, 
excluded banking, 
insurance, 
investments 
U.S. 
120 Horizontal 
Mergers 
SR No effect 
Allen and 
Jagtiani (2000) 
1986-1994 
Bank, Insurance, 
and Securities 
U.S. 729 banks, Diversified TR, SR 
Increase SR, 
reduce TR 
Rahim and 
Ananaba (2000) 
1975-1992 Diversified U.S. 
148 Conglomerate, 117 
Non-Conglomerate 
Mergers 
TR, SR 
SR & TR 
increase in both 
cases 
Amihud, Delong, 
and Saunders 
(2002) 
1985-1998 Banking 
Europe, U.S., 
Australia, 
Canada, 
Japan. 
214 Cross-Border 
Mergers 
TR, SR No effect 
Mishra et al. 
(2005) 
2002-2004 Banks with Banks U.S. 
14 banks, Non-
Conglomerate 
TR, SR, 
USR 
Reduce TR & 
USR, no effect 
for SR 
Dube and 
Glasscock (2006) 
1975-1996 
Non-financial and 
non-utility 
U.S. 256  Domestic Mergers 
TR, SR, 
Business  
Increase TR, SR 
and business 
risk for cash 
payment deals 
Mei and Sun 
(2007) 
1990-2004 Forest Industry U.S. 57 Horizontal Mergers SR Reduce SR 
Focarelli, 
Pozzolo, and 
Salleo (2008) 
1988-2007 Financial Industry 75 countries 
1400 cross-border and 
cross-industry deals 
SR 
Increased SR & 
WACC 
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
1986-2004 
Banks and 
Insurance 
Europe 
42 Domestic and 
Cross-Border 
TR, SR  
Reduce SR, no 
effect for TR 
Evripidou (2012) 2005-2010 Airline Industry 
European, 
U.S. 
5 Horizontal Mergers SR 
Reduce SR & 
WACC 
Bozos, Koutmos, 
and Song (2013) 
1998-2010 Bank U.S. 177 Large Deals SR Increased SR 
Casu et al. (2015) 1991-2012 
Bank/Non-Bank 
Combinations 
U.S., Europe, 
Canada, Asia, 
Australia, 
South 
America, 
Africa 
218 bank-insurance 
deals, 54 bank-
securities mergers 
TR, SR, 
USR 
Bank-insurance 
increase SR, 
bank-securities 
increase TR 
* Note: TR is total risk, SR is systematic risk, USR is unsystematic risk, WACC is weighted average 
cost of capital 
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Table 2: Univariate Results: Acquirers’ Market Risk 
‘Beta before deal’ and ‘Beta after deal’ refer to acquirers’ pre-merger and post-merger market risk, respectively, calculated for 
the periods –260 to –20 before and +20 to +260 after announcement day, using a standard CAPM model. ∆Beta = Beta after 
deal – Beta before deal. Beta is the covariance between an acquirer’s returns and the benchmark local price index returns 
(DataStream Code: LI) divided by the variance in the benchmark local price index returns. The relevant sub-samples for the 
categories are determined according to: (1) Cash-only is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the acquirer used cash-only as the 
method of payment, and ‘0’ otherwise, (2) Stock-only is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the acquirer used stock only as the 
method of payment, and ‘0’ otherwise, (3) Mixed method of payment (Mixed) is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the acquirer 
used mixed methods, and ‘0’ otherwise, (4) Public Targets is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the deal involves a public target, 
and ‘0’ otherwise, (5) Non-Public Targets is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the deal involves a non-public target (Private 
and Subsidiary), and ‘0’ otherwise, (6) Global Diversification is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the acquirer and target are 
located in different countries, and ‘0’ otherwise, (7) Industry Diversification is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the acquirer 
and target are operate in different industries (based on the initial two digits of their digit SIC codes), and ‘0’ otherwise, (8) 
Dum. Exp. 3-Y is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the three preceding 
years, and ‘0’ otherwise, (9) Dum. Exp. 5-Y is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the same bidder has two or more completed 
deals over the five preceding years (a serial acquirer), and ‘0’ otherwise.  The univariate tests of mean differences in ∆Beta 
test the null hypothesis that the deals belong to that category (e.g. Public) or not. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
One-Sample Statistics 
    N Mean Median Std. Dev. Std. Error Sig. 
Beta before deal 34221 0.73 0.691 0.595 0.0032 0.000*** 
Beta after deal 34221 0.751 0.715 0.596 0.0032 0.000*** 
∆ Beta 34221 0.021 0.015 0.56 0.003 0.000*** 
 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U-test 
Subsample Statistics 
for deals with N ∆ Beta Mean Diff. p-value Mean Rank Z p-value 
Cash-Only  10167 0.0092** -0.0173 .003*** 16843 -3.267 .001*** 
Stock-Only  8594 0.0329*** 0.0155 .049** 17274 -1.765 .078* 
Mixed 5101 0.0399*** 0.0218 0.01*** 17441 -2.584 .01*** 
Public Targets 10869 0.0179*** -0.005 0.406 17098 -0.169 0.865 
Non-Public Targets 23352 0.0229*** -0.005 0.872 17117 -0.169 0.865 
Global Diversification 8222 0.019*** -0.0023 0.672 17035 -798 0.425 
Industry Diversification 15761 0.0169** -0.008 0.186 17048 -1.095 0.274 
Dum Exp. 3-Y deals 16382 0.0297*** 0.008 .0161** 17324 -3.829 .000*** 
Dum Exp. 5-Y deals 19181 0.0301*** 0.001 .0200** 17327 -4.573 .000*** 
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Table 3: Univariate Results: Accounting for Acquirers’ Pre-Beta 
The overall sample of deals is divided according to whether acquirers’ ex-ante beta values are less than or greater than 1. The 
relevant sub-subsamples for the categories are reported in Table 2. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean p-value 
Pre-Beta<1 
Beta before deal. 
24058 
0.4421 0.3861 0.0025 .000*** 
Beta after deal. 0.5664 0.4948 0.0032 .000*** 
∆ Beta 0.1243 0.493 0.0032 .000*** 
Pre-Beta>1 
Beta Before deal. 
10163 
1.4106 0.4251 0.0042 .000*** 
Beta After deal. 1.1882 0.5858 0.0058 .000*** 
∆ Beta -0.2224 0.6283 0.0062 .000*** 
  Pre-Beta<1 Pre-Beta>1 
∆ Beta  Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Err.  
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Err.  
All Sample .1243*** 0.0721 0.493 0.0032 -.2224*** -0.1707 0.6283 0.0062 
Cash Only .0926*** 0.0569 0.383 0.0046 -.1792*** -0.1482 0.4435 0.0079 
Stock Only .1669*** 0.0992 0.5874 0.0077 -.2482*** -0.2143 0.7149 0.0136 
Mixed 0.1489*** 0.0818 0.5105 0.0084 -0.2513*** -0.2184 0.6436 0.0173 
Public Targets .1133*** 0.0728 0.4038 0.0047 -.1802*** -0.1524 0.5293 0.0089 
Non-Public Targets .1291*** 0.0719 0.5273 0.0041 -.2449*** -0.1805 0.6741 0.0083 
Global Div. 0.1171*** 0.0674 0.4620 0.0062 -0.1904*** -0.1436 0.5740 0.0112 
Industry Div. 0.1215*** 0.0717 0.5181 0.0049 -0.2327*** -0.1714 0.6771 0.0099 
Exp. 3-Y .1295*** 0.0814 0.4454 0.0042 -.1763*** -0.152 0.5926 0.0081 
Exp. 5-Y .1317*** 0.0828 0.4487 0.0039 -.1831*** -0.1551 0.5905 0.0075 
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Table 4: Risk Regressions 
The dependent variable is the change in acquirers’ systematic risk (∆Beta). The independent variables are: (1) cash-only, (2) stock-only, 
(3) Cash and Stock (mixed method of payment), (4) public targets, (5) global diversification, (6) industry diversification, (7) Exp. 3-Y: the 
cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three years, (8) logarithm of transaction values, (9) 
logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (10) acquirers’ pre-beta (beta before deal), measured over the period –260 to –20 
before announcement day, (11) bidder size, measured by the logarithm of acquirers’ market capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement 
day, (12) legal and institutional quality in target countries, (13) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on announcement day (M/B Ratio), 
(14) legal origin (represented by a common law dummy) for target countries.  Models 1-9 are estimated using the entire sample, while 
Models 10-11 are estimated for U.S. acquirers and Models 12-13 are estimated for non-U.S. acquirers. Heteroskedasticity-corrected 
estimates are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects 
where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
No. obs 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 25468 25468 25468 10225 10225 15243 15243 
R2 0.170 0.172 0.169 0.171 0.174 0.172 0.179 0.180 0.174 0.213 0.221 0.160 0.322 
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.172 0.169 0.171 0.173 0.171 0.179 0.180 0.173 0.211 0.220 0.159 0.321 
F-test 854.34 867.53 849.76 576.80 585.61 577.75 371.11 373.70 356.44 196.82 206.79 192.99 481.49 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.227 0.232 0.223 0.222 0.224 0.217 0.222 0.227 0.220 -0.030 0.010 0.309 0.308 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.834) (0.943) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-Only 
-0.024   -0.022   -0.027   -0.042  -0.015  
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.014)  
Stock-Only 
 0.043   0.043   0.053   0.052  0.039 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cash and Stock 
  0.013   0.013   0.005     
  (0.066)   (0.055)   (0.555)     
Public 
   -0.021 -0.025 -0.023 -0.028 -0.033 -0.029 -0.055 -0.059 -0.003 -0.009 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.646) (0.209) 
Global Diversification 
   -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 0.064 0.057 -0.010 -0.007 
   (0.210) (0.396) (0.097) (0.600) (0.951) (0.330) (0.001) (0.003) (0.147) (0.290) 
Industry Diversification 
   0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.013 0.015 
   (0.246) (0.176) (0.364) (0.160) (0.110) (0.495) (0.878) (0.877) (0.025) (0.013) 
Exp. 3-Y 
   0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.009 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
0.009 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 -0.010 -0.009 0.013 0.012 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.177) (0.248) (0.003) (0.007) 
GDP (Target) 
-0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.055 0.046 -0.023 -0.026 
(0.194) (0.030) (0.118) (0.192) (0.044) (0.109) (0.800) (0.325) (0.626) (0.082) (0.145) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.395 -0.399 -0.396 -0.396 -0.400 -0.398 -0.391 -0.398 -0.392 -0.433 -0.436 -0.368 -0.371 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Bidder Size 
0.067 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.060 0.061 0.058 0.085 0.084 0.050 0.052 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Ins Quality (Target) 
      -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
      (0.774) (0.400) (0.638) (0.607) (0.559) (0.276) (0.186) 
M/B Ratio 
      0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
      (0.192) (0.240) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Law (Target) 
      0.026 0.025 0.026 0.049 0.039 -0.005 -0.004 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.121) (0.459) (0.557) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Risk Regressions: Accounting for Acquirers’ Pre-Beta 
The dependent variable and independent variables are the same as reported in Table 4, except that the diversification dummies (global and 
industry), which are insignificant, are excluded from the regressions. Models 1-6 are estimated for the sample of deals with acquirers having 
pre-beta >1, and Models 7-12 are estimated for deals with acquirers having pre-beta <1. Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported 
with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects where possible (subject to 
avoidance of multicollinearity). 
  Pre-Beta>1 Pre-Beta<1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
No. obs 9870 9870 9870 7749 7749 7749 23618 23618 23618 17719 17719 17719 
R2 0.135 0.136 0.133 0.128 0.131 0.125 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.088 0.085 0.122 
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.135 0.132 0.127 0.130 0.124 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.087 0.084 0.121 
F-test 153.48 154.77 150.99 87.32 89.82 85.07 218.80 220.75 218.32 131.50 126.24 189.44 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.195 0.207 0.188 0.230 0.244 0.220 0.229 0.227 0.228 0.217 0.214 0.230 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-Only 
-0.017   -0.016    -0.019   -0.021   
(0.066)   (0.122)    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Stock-Only 
 0.048   0.057    0.031   0.042  
 (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Cash and Stock 
  0.016   0.000   0.012   0.009 
  (0.253)   (0.987)   (0.099)   (0.320) 
Public 
-0.042 -0.047 -0.042 -0.033 -0.040 -0.033 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.020 -0.024 -0.029 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.201) (0.057) (0.158) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp. 3-Y 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 
(0.060) (0.022) (0.135) (0.492) (0.602) (0.361) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
0.012 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.008 
(0.074) (0.084) (0.049) (0.337) (0.416) (0.189) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) 
GDP (Target) 
0.000 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.001 0.002 
(0.975) (0.614) (0.880) (0.977) (0.584) (0.963) (0.529) (0.322) (0.385) (0.549) (0.876) (0.817) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.454 -0.459 -0.452 -0.462 -0.464 -0.458 -0.390 -0.392 -0.392 -0.377 -0.380 -0.383 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Bidder Size 
0.112 0.113 0.111 0.092 0.093 0.088 0.047 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.048 0.041 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Ins Quality (Target) 
   -0.008 -0.009 -0.008    0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.248) (0.187) (0.227)    (0.973) (0.800) (0.646) 
M/B Ratio 
   0.009 0.008 0.010    0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.025) (0.061) (0.013)    (0.421) (0.447) (0.519) 
Common Law (Target) 
   0.038 0.041 0.041    0.015 0.015 0.013 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.028) (0.033) (0.051) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
